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Dymond et al. (1) raise four possible issues with our recent paper
on causal reasoning in New Caledonian crows (2).
First, they suggest that the crows in our study became sen-
sitized, rather than habituated, to the probing stick. However,
there is direct evidence of habituation in our experiment
[the decrease in inspections over trials 1–3 in the unknown
causal agent (UCA) condition] that rules out this possibility.
Furthermore, neophobia in these crows, like most birds,
generally decreases over time (3).
Second, they suggest that our design should have been coun-
terbalanced. Counterbalancing is useful when there is likely to be
a directional trend in the data that could confound the results.
However, in our experiment, the most probable directional effect
(habituation to the probing stick) runs counter to the predictions
of the hidden causal agent hypothesis. What is striking about
our results is the low rate of inspections in the initial human causal
agent (HCA) condition and then, despite the habituation to the
stick, the high rates in the initial UCA condition.
The third issue Dymond et al. (1) raise is the suggestion that the
crows paired the moving stick with a human leaving the hide.
However, there are two sides of our results that need to be ex-
plained: (i) a lack of increase in inspections in the HCA trials
and (ii) an increase in the UCA trials. An account based on the
pairing of the emerging stick and human cannot account for
the HCA results. The crows see a stick emerge from the hide for
the first time into a place where they are about to put their heads,
yet they show no increase in inspections. New Caledonian crows
are highly neophobic, and so should have been averse to going
near where the stick was, particularly one that might hit them.
Thus, the associative account has to assume that the crows, on
seeing a new object and an event that could cause them harm if
repeated, immediately risked serious injury. We find this ex-
tremely implausible. The most probable reason why the crows
reacted calmly was that they inferred that because the human had
left the hide, the stick could no longer hit them. In the UCA
condition, the fact that the crows inspected the hide, rather than
the location from which the person might emerge, is consistent
with this account.
Finally, Dymond et al. (1) speculate that other differences be-
tween our conditions could have led to the observed effect. In the
HCA condition, the crows observed two people enter and exit
the cage, whereas in the UCA condition, they observed one. The
crows had rarely seen two humans enter the cage at the same time
but had seen a single human enter and exit the cage daily. However,
they showed a neophobic reaction to this more familiar event in
the UCA condition. Similarly, variation in the spatial location
of the humans in our experiment runs counter to our observed ef-
fect. In the HCA condition, two people moved into novel spatial
locations in the room. In the UCA condition, one person moved
into what was now a familiar spatial location, yet it was in this
condition that we saw a reaction.
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